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UNRINGING THE BELL:
PUBLICLY FUNDED ART AND THE
GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
John Barlow*
The framers of the United States Constitution drafted the First
Amendment with the intent to codify one of the United States’ foundational
and immutable individual rights: the freedom of speech. While this
freedom has remained a bedrock of constitutional law and a core value
protected by the Court, it is not without its nuances and exceptions. The
Government Speech Doctrine, a recently minted judicial concept, is one
such nuance. The Doctrine states that when the government is the speaker
the First Amendment does not restrict its speech, and it may disseminate
particular ideas or discriminate against particular viewpoints. At its core,
the Government Speech Doctrine is an attempt by the Court to balance the
need of a functional government with First Amendment rights. The
Doctrine, while attempting to navigate the tension between free speech and
government activities, creates an interesting question:
when does
government involvement in speech make that speech an extension of the
government and thus subject to the Government Speech Doctrine?
The realm of publicly funded art is an arena where this question is
particularly nettlesome. When the government or a governmental unit
funds the creation of public artwork, who is the speaker? Is the
government the speaker when it provides funding and space for the art?
Does the government speech cease once the government has exercised its
control in allocating funding to a particular artist for a particular work?
Where does an intended government message stop and the expressive
nature of art to provoke dialogue and convey multiple messages begin?
* J.D. Candidate, Emory Law School, 2014; B.F.A., University of Washington, 2007. The author
would like to thank his family, friends, and colleagues for their support and encouragement
during the production of this Article. He would like to thank Michael Tomback and Forrest
Flemming for their helpful insight and criticism on the content and structure of this Article. He
also gives special thanks to Professor Thomas Arthur for his guidance and expertise on the First
Amendment and how to address that topic. He would also like to extend his utmost gratitude to
the staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for each person’s thoughtful
contribution to this Article, and to the staff of the Emory Law Journal for providing guidance
during the Article writing process. Finally, he would like to thank the readers who have taken the
time to read and reflect on the fascinating overlap between art and the law.
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How do you separate the vision of the artist from the views of the
government and ascertain what in the artwork is government speech and
what is private artistic speech? Where do the rights of the government end
and the rights of the artist begin?
This Article advances the novel argument that within the domain of
removing publicly funded art from public display, the application of the
Government Speech Doctrine is improper because of the current scope and
policy considerations of the Doctrine, the mutable nature of art speech, and
artist moral rights. As an alternative, this Article proposes a model statute
legislatures should adopt that outlines an appropriate analytical framework
for removing public art from public display that takes into consideration
individual free speech rights, the government’s right to control its own
messages, the nature of art speech, and artist moral rights.
I.

INTRODUCTION

“An Artist is not paid for his labor but for his vision.”
— James Abbott McNeill Whistler*1
Art is speech;2 it resonates from our past in pottery shards,
illuminated manuscripts, and frescos. Because art is speech, it is protected
by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3 While
limited carve-outs to free speech exist, the protections offered by the First
Amendment have been widely protected by the Supreme Court.4 These
protections range from preventing the government from invidiously
discriminating or suppressing speech based on content or viewpoint to

1. James Abbott McNeill Whistler quoted in ANU GARG, ANOTHER WORD A
DAY 163 (2005).
2. Art is protected speech under the First Amendment, with the general
narrow exceptions to First Amendment protection still applying. See, e.g., Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(finding that artworks such as Jackson Pollock paintings are “unquestionably
shielded” by the First Amendment).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(“[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971)
(finding anti-draft speech was protected because it did not “incite disobedience”);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (denying free speech protection to
obscene speech because it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”); see
also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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ensuring that public forums remain open to vigorous public debate.5
However, when the government is the speaker, it does not need to maintain
viewpoint neutrality, a judicial concept implied by the Supreme Court in
the late 1970s.6 This theory, known as the Government Speech Doctrine,
has since expanded to classify a broad spectrum of actions as government
speech, from the choice to fund specific government programs, to the
decision to approve or deny public space for private speakers.7 The
Government Speech Doctrine is an attempt by the Court to balance private,
individual speech rights with government’s need to control its own
functions.8 Although courts have used the Government Speech Doctrine to
justify the removal of publicly funded artworks from public spaces, the
application of the Doctrine to such removals is improper because of the
scope and underlying policy considerations of the Doctrine, the mutable
nature of art speech, and artist moral rights.9
Part I of this Article introduces the Free Speech Doctrine and the
more recently minted Government Speech Doctrine, and briefly traces the
latter’s history through case and policy analysis. Part II discusses the
mutable nature of art as identified by both the Court and the intellectual
community, focusing on the ability of art speech to change based on
individual perspective and through spatial and temporal context. It focuses
on broad changes in art theory and psychological analyses of individual
reactions to art to explore the mutable nature of art on a personal level, and
discusses the changing nature of art speech as it relates to the passage of
time and the context in which an artwork is displayed. Part III discusses
the moral rights of artists, first by laying out a brief history of moral rights
as they exist in Europe, then as they currently exist in the United States
under the 1990 Visual Artists Rights Act. Part III then discusses the
tension that exists between moral rights and the Government Speech
Doctrine and concludes that moral rights make the application of the
Doctrine improper with regards to the removal of public artwork from
public spaces. Finally, Part IV proposes a model statute that establishes an
analytical framework for the removal of publicly funded art from public

5. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (noting
“access to the streets, parks, and other similar public places . . . for the purposes of
exercising [First Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied broadly”)
(internal quotations omitted).
6. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part III.A.
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display. The proposed statute sidesteps the issue of government speech
versus private speech and takes into consideration the classic free speech
protection, the government’s right to speak, the mutable nature of art
speech, and moral rights. After proposing the statute, Part IV discusses its
provisions and outlines its potential application in a case and possible
ramifications.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF FREE SPEECH
AND THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE
This Part explores the landscape of the First Amendment, from the
protection offered to private individuals to government speech regulation.
Private individuals have robust free speech rights that cannot be limited by
the government outside of a narrow band of exceptions.10 Alternatively,
when the government is viewed as the speaker, its speech is not regulated
by the Free Speech Clause and thus is not required to remain viewpoint
neutral.11 Not surprisingly, considerable tension exists between these two
broad concepts. This Article’s focus is on the specific tension that exists
between government funding or encouragement of speech and the retention
of control over the speech in question. The following sections will address
the inception and context of the Government Speech Doctrine.
A. The First Amendment: A Brief Overview
At the core of the First Amendment is the concept that the
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”12 Although this concept seems
axiomatic, the Supreme Court never actually ruled on the constitutionality
of any federal law involving free speech until the early part of the twentieth
century.13 Since then, unabridged free speech has been widely protected,
with the Court finding only very narrow and limited exceptions to speech
regulation in realms such as speech inciting violence,14 obscenity,15 and
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000) (finding a government entity has the right to “speak for itself”); see also
infra Part I.B.1.
12. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
13. See Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Espionage Act).
14. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (curbing speech
against the government only where such speech is “directed to incit[e] or produc[e]
imminent lawless action”).
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defamation.16 Free speech rights have also been expanded into previously
regulated areas such as political speech,17 anonymous speech,18 and flag
desecration.19
While the Court has found that individuals have the right to widely
unrestricted private speech,20 this right is not unequivocal and depends on
the setting in which the speech takes place. This theory, known as the
Forum Doctrine, divides these settings into three categories: traditional
public forums,21 limited or designated public forums,22 and nonpublic
forums.23 Speech in public forums, whether traditional or limited, can only
be narrowly limited,24 whereas speech in nonpublic forums may be more
widely regulated.25 Special considerations regarding free speech regulation
are given to particularly sensitive forums such as public schools.26 With
15. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (creating a “community
standards” analysis for what is considered obscene speech).
16. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (making
“actual malice” the standard for defamation suits).
17. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010)
(finding political spending is a form of protected speech under the First
Amendment).
18. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (striking down a Los
Angeles ban against the distribution of anonymous pamphlets).
19. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989) (finding a Texas ban
against flag burning to be unconstitutional).
20. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (noting that there is a “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
21. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (defining traditional public forums as “streets and parks which have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public”) (internal quotations
omitted). See also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (finding a
certain type of sidewalk not to be a traditional public forum and thus narrowly
construing the definition of public forum promoted in Perry).
22. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (defining limited public forums as those which “the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity”).
23. Id. at 46 (defining a nonpublic forum as one where “[p]ublic property
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication”).
24. Id. at 45 (permitting time, place, or manner restrictions on speech).
25. Id. at 46 (stating that within nonpublic forums, “communication is
governed by different standards”).
26. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(balancing student free speech rights on school campuses against countervailing
societal interests).
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the very basic structure of individual free speech rights in mind, this Article
now turns to the Government Speech Doctrine.
B. The Common Law Development of the Government Speech Doctrine
The Government Speech Doctrine asserts that when the government
is the speaker, it does not have to maintain viewpoint neutrality.27 This
doctrine is crystalized in Rust v. Sullivan28 and its progeny, but has its roots
in Wooley v. Maynard,29 where the Court opined that a state could have an
interest sufficiently compelling to curb free speech protection.30 In Wooley,
the state of New Hampshire required noncommercial motor vehicles to
display the state motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates. 31 Two
residents of New Hampshire, the Maynards, refused to display the motto on
their automobile and Mr. Maynard was cited, fined, and jailed for 15 days
after refusing to pay his fines.32 Mr. Maynard sued to enjoin further
enforcement of the statute, claiming a violation of his free speech rights.33
The Supreme Court began its free speech inquiry by acknowledging
that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment . . .
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking
at all.”34 The Court identified the Maynards’ interest in “hold[ing] a point
of view different from [New Hampshire]” and acknowledged that a state
could have an interest sufficient to compel an individual to display a state
motto on his or her car.35 Ultimately, however, the Court found that New
Hampshire could not “stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end

27. See infra Part I.C.; see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)
(noting that the government may promote certain points of view when funding
programs).
28. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (holding that the Government can, without
violating the Constitution, fund certain programs it believes to be in the public’s
interest without funding an alternative program that would deal with the same issue
in a different way).
29. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
30. Id. at 716.
31. Id. at 707.
32. Id. at 708.
33. Id. at 709.
34. Id. at 714.
35. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-16 (deciding whether “[New Hampshire’s]
countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to
display the state motto on their license plates”).
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can be more narrowly achieved.”36
Wooley demonstrates the limit of the government’s power to compel
speech by private individuals.37 The opinion also analyzes the underlying
government right to speak phrases like “Live Free or Die.”38 Although the
government did not satisfy its burden in Wooley, the Supreme Court opined
that a state could have a “countervailing interest” sufficiently compelling to
curb Free Speech protection.39 Through this aspect of Wooley, the Court
laid the foundation for the Government Speech Doctrine, though it lay
fallow for fourteen years.
1. Cultivating the Landscape Created by Wooley v. Maynard
Rust v. Sullivan40 marked the first time that the Supreme Court
explicitly created the Government Speech Doctrine and laid out its
analytical framework. In Rust, recipients of Title X funding (“Petitioners”)
brought suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (“Secretary”) for preventing the use of such funds for abortions or
abortion-related activities.41 Section 300 of Title X, passed in 1970,
authorized the Secretary to “make grants and to enter into contracts with
public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and
operation of . . . family planning projects . . . and effective family planning
methods.”42 In 1988, the Secretary interpreted section 300 to mean
“preventive family planning” that did not include abortion or abortionrelated counseling.43 Petitioners’ suit alleged a violation of their First
Amendment rights.44
36. Id. at 716. One of the reasons put forth by New Hampshire in support of
the requirement that individuals display the state motto on their cars was to
“promot[e] appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.” Id.
The Court rejected that argument, stating “where the State’s interest is to
disseminate an ideology . . . such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First
Amendment right to avoid becoming a courier for such message.” Id. at 717.
37. See, e.g., id. at 712.
38. See generally id.
39. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716-17.
40. See generally Rust, 500 U.S. at 173.
41. Id. at 181.
42. Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)(1970)).
43. Id. at 179 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-1667, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.)).
44. Id. at 192. Petitioners alleged that the Government violated their First
Amendment rights by “impermissibly imposing viewpoint-discriminatory
conditions on government subsidies . . . [b]ecause Title X continues to fund speech
ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that is not evenhanded with respect to
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The Supreme Court began its analysis of the alleged First Amendment
rights violation by bluntly stating that “[t]he Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way.”45 In distinguishing government funding of a program from
otherwise prohibited viewpoint discrimination, the Court rationalized that
“[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternate activity
consonant with legislative policy.”46 The Court also identified policy
reasons underpinning the ability of the Government to condition funding on
certain prerequisites.47 In holding that conditioning the receipt of
government funds on certain speech restrictions is constitutional, the Court
emphasized that the Title X recipients were only “limited during the time
that they actually work[ed] for the project.”48
Four years later in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,49 the Supreme Court considered whether a university could
withhold payments to third-party contractors for the printing of a student
publication on the basis of a specific ideology supported by that
publication.50 In Rosenberger, Wide Awake Productions (“WAP”), an

views and information about abortion, [and thus] invidiously discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint” (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 193.
46. Rust, 500 U.S. at 175, 193 (1991) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
475 (1977)). Programs receiving Title X funding were also not completely barred
from engaging in pro-abortion or abortion-related speech. The Court distinguished
Rust as not completely barring an otherwise constitutionally protected right to
engage in such speech because “[t]he regulations do not force the Title X grantee,
or its employees, to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that such
activities be kept separate and distinct from . . . the Title X project.”
47. Id. at 194. In the context of funding programs to promote what the Court
identified as “permissible goals,” the Government would necessarily discourage
alternative goals, but to hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint “would render numerous government programs
constitutionally suspect.”
48. Id. at 199. The Court expanded this concept that a funding recipient’s
speech was restricted only within the scope of the governmentally supported
project by more broadly stating that “[t]he general rule that the Government may
choose not to subsidize speech applies with full force.” Id. at 200.
49. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
50. Id. at 822–23.
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independent student organization51 at the University of Virginia, was
denied funding from the Student Activities Fund (“SAF”) to print and
publish a student newspaper because of the paper’s Christian viewpoint.52
WAP brought suit against the University, alleging that the denial of SAF
support based on the publication’s Christian perspective violated
constitutionally protected free speech.53
The Court began its analysis of the alleged free speech violation by
laying out the general groundwork of free speech protection54 and the
importance of the location of the speech.55 Following this analysis, the
Court then reaffirmed the Government Speech Doctrine it established in
Rust.56 However, the Court then distinguished the speech at hand from the
speech in Rust, finding that when the government “expends funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers[,]” it may not regulate
that speech based on viewpoint.57 The Court articulated that “[t]he danger
to liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine publications to
determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so,
for the State to classify them.”58 In ultimately concluding that the
University violated the free speech rights of WAP, the Court found that the
University, by providing funds that subsidized student activities, created a
limited public forum that was required to include all viewpoints. 59 More
51. Id. at 823–25. Also known as “Contracted Independent Organizations”
(CIOs), groups that achieve this status may, among other things, have access to
school facilities and apply for funding from the SAF as long as they sign a contract
acknowledging that they are separate and distinct from the University of Virginia.
52. Id. at 825, 827 (alteration in original). The University guidelines for
SAF payments specifically excluded the use of funds for religious activities which
were described as “any activity that ‘primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity.’”
53. Id. at 827.
54. Id. at 828–29.
55. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (finding that the classic setting of the
University as a forum for the exchange of ideas and the limited public forum
created by the SAF were relevant to the analysis).
56. Id. at 833 (acknowledging that “when the State is the speaker, it may
make content-based choices”).
57. Id. at 833-34. The Court further distinguished this case from Rust
because in Rust, “the government did not create a program to encourage private
speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining
to its own program.”
58. Id. at 835. Another corollary danger to speech identified was the
potential “chilling of individual thought and expression.”
59. Id. at 837.
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broadly, this limited public forum indicated that the government in
Rosenberger was not speaking but rather subsidizing private, individual
speech.60
Three years later a related but distinct issue relating to the
Government Speech Doctrine and art arose in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley.61 In Finley, the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”),
based on the direction of a 1990 Congressional Amendment to the National
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (“Act”), denied
funding to four individual artists who had previously been recommended
for funding prior to the 1990 amendment.62 The unamended Act identified
funding considerations broadly, including “artistic and cultural
significance, giving emphasis to . . . creative and cultural diversity.”63 The
amendment directed the chairperson of the NEA to “tak[e] into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public.”64 The artists brought suit
seeking restoration of the recommendation that their grants be approved,
asserting that the “decency and respect” standard promulgated by the 1990
amendment violated the Free Speech Clause by imposing invidious
viewpoint discrimination.65
The Court first acknowledged the general purpose of the NEA to
support the arts66 but qualified this support, stating that “although the First
Amendment applies in the subsidy context, Congress has wide latitude to

60. Here, the University, due to its funding structure for student groups,
subsidized private speech as it would classic forum speech, just as streets and
parks were subsidized by the government. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
312 (finding political spending is a form of protected speech under the First
Amendment).
61. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
62. Id. at 569.
63. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C. § 954(c)(1) (2006).
64. Id. § 954(d)(1); see Finley, 524 U.S. at 591. This amendment to the Act
was implemented in response to a number of public criticisms on the use of NEA
grants to fund two shows: one, a retrospective of works by Robert Mapplethorpe
containing homoerotic images; and the other, a work by Andres Serrano called
“Piss Christ.” See id. at 574.
65. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572.
66. 20 U.S.C. §§ 953(b), 951(7) (The Act created a “broadly conceived
national policy of support for the . . . arts in the United States” and pledged federal
funds to “help create and sustain . . . a climate encouraging . . . the release of
creative talent.”); see also id. § 952 (2006).
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set spending priorities.”67 Rejecting the argument that the “decency and
respect” standard would inevitably “be utilized as a tool for invidious
viewpoint discrimination,” the Court found it was permissible for the NEA
to consider “respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public” when approving or rejecting grant applications.68 The Court was
also careful to distinguish the funding here from the funding in
Rosenberger, articulating that “[i]n the context of arts funding, in contrast
to many other subsidies, the Government does not indiscriminately
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.’”69 So long as the
NEA was not “leverag[ing] its power to award subsidies on the basis of
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints” or
“impos[ing] . . . a disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace,’” then it was merely choosing “to fund
one activity to the exclusion of another.”70
In the most recent Supreme Court case to deal with the overlap
between government speech and art, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum,71 the Court addressed the issue of whether a city violated free
speech rights when it refused to display a privately-funded monument in a
67. Finley, 524 U.S. at 571; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (granting Congress the authority to set certain
spending priorities).
68. Finley, 524 U.S. at 582-84.
69. Id. at 586. The Court also found the competitive process to receive the
grants to be a distinguishing feature from Rosenberger where the funds were
indiscriminately allocated to any group classified as a CIO. Id. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Souter challenged this distinction, finding that “Rosenberger
controls here.” Id. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter pointed out that
scarcity in funding that makes the process competitive does not allow for otherwise
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 614-15. Furthermore, Souter felt
that “the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” and feared the “chilling
effect” the NEA’s “decency and respect” standard would have on the artistic
community. Id. at 621. Souter’s dissent is interesting as it is an attempt to create
an alternative rationale for judging competitive funding offered by a governmental
body.
70. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (majority opinion). Conditioning the receipt
of funds on certain speech limitations has been upheld in a variety of contexts by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S.
194, 196 (2003) (holding that “[w]hen the Government appropriates public funds
to establish a program, it is entitled to broadly define that program’s limits”). See
also Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
871–72 (1982) (finding that while libraries have the ability to choose what books
to add to their collection, “local school boards may not remove books from school
library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books”).
71. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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public park.72 In Summum, a religious organization requested to erect a
stone monument containing the “Seven Aphorisms of SUMMUM” in a
public park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah.73 Pleasant Grove City denied the
request several times and Summum filed suit, alleging a violation of its free
speech rights.74
The Court identified the novelty of the issue75 and structured its
analysis of the issue by first analyzing its precedent dealing with
government speech.76 First, the Court recognized the right of a government
entity to speak, either on its own behalf or through a private entity, but
couched that right with the acknowledgment that “the government does not
have a free hand to regulate private speech on government property.”77
While the Court admitted that “[t]here may be situations in which it is
difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf
or is providing a forum for private speech,”78 it had no trouble quickly
identifying that “[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property . . .
represent government speech.”79 The Court supported its advancement of
this idea on several principles.80 Historically, governments have used
monuments to speak.81 Second, the Court identified that cities, like
Pleasant Grove, often exercised control over the selection process.82 The
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id. at 465.
74. Id. at 465-66.
75. Id. at 467 (“No prior decision of this Court has addressed the application
of the Free Speech Clause to a government entity’s acceptance of privately
donated, permanent monuments for installation in a public park.”).
76. Id. at 467.
77. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467-69.
78. Id. at 470 (The Court also acknowledged that in certain instances a
government entity may create a limited forum, and in such a forum may impose
restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.); see Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (describing how a limited
public forum is created); see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
106 -08 (2001) (finding a limited public forum where a school allowed groups to
use its facilities after hours).
79. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
80. Id. at 470-71.
81. Id. at 470; see also id. at 471 (concluding that both publicly and privately
financed and donated monuments constituted government speech because it is “not
common for property owners to open up their property for the installation of
permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated.”).
82. Id. at 471-72.
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fact that the land in question was a public park influenced the Court in
determining that this speech was government speech because public parks
are “often closely identified in the public mind with the government unit
that owns the land.”83
The Court then tackled the more complicated issue of what sort of
message an art piece, such as a monument, actually conveys. The Court
first admitted that the meaning conveyed by a monument is not generally
simple or one-dimensional.84 Articulating the dynamic nature of art
speech, the Court found that
[b]y accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on
city property, a city engages in expressive conduct, but the
intended and perceived significance of that conduct may not
coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.
Indeed, when a privately donated memorial is funded by many
small donations, the donors themselves may differ in their
interpretations of the monument’s significance. By accepting
such a monument, a government entity does not necessarily
endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in
the monument.85
The Court also noted “the message that a government entity conveys
by allowing a monument to remain on its property may also be altered by
the subsequent addition of other monuments in the same vicinity” and can
“change over time.”86 It is notable that the Court so readily classified the
monument in question as government speech yet articulated the difficulty
in identifying any particular message that it could convey.87 The difficulty
of pinning down a particular message conveyed by art speech is highlighted
by the four concurring opinions filed in Summum, which express varying
viewpoints regarding the reach and merits of the Government Speech

83. Id. at 472.
84. Id. at 474 (offering examples of the difficulty in attaching a meaning to a
monument such as, “[s]ome observers may ‘imagine’ the musical contributions of
John Lennon . . . [o]thers may think of the lyrics of the Lennon song.”); id. at 475
(describing another example of attaching a meaning to a monument with a bronze
statue in Arkansas displaying the word “Peace” in many languages); id. (admitting
that when the monuments are not text-based their message is likely to “be even
more variable.”).
85. Summum, 555 U.S. at 476–77.
86. Id. at 477.
87. Id. at 476-77.
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Doctrine.88
2. Interpreting the Landscape: Newton v. LePage
The government has the ability to speak, be it through funding89 or
denying public space for private speech.90 However, as the concurring
opinions in Summum highlighted, the scope of the Government Speech
Doctrine and its appropriate application are ill-defined. This ill-defined
scope of the Government Speech Doctrine is further highlighted in Newton
v. LePage.91
In Newton, the First Circuit addressed the issue of whether a mural
paid for with public funds hanging in the Maine Department of Labor
(“MDOL”) constituted government speech.92 In 2007, Judith Taylor was
commissioned to create a mural for the MDOL antechamber.93 The
finished mural94 was installed and presented to the public in August of
2008.95 In early 2011 Paul LePage, the recently elected governor of Maine,
received an anonymous complaint about the mural, and in March 2011, the
mural was taken down and placed in storage.96 After the removal of the
mural, Taylor and other Maine residents brought suit alleging free speech
88. Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing doubt about the merit of
the entire government speech doctrine when stating,“[t]o date, our decisions
relying on the recently minted government speech doctrine to uphold government
actions have been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.”); id. at 487 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (offering an alternative approach to developing a per se rule as to what
speech is governmental, stating “the best approach that occurs to me is to ask
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression
to be government speech”).
89. See, e.g., Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 192-93.
90. See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.
91. Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 2012).
92. Id. at 597.
93. Id.
94. See infra App., illus. 1.
95. Newton, 700 F.3d at 598.
96. Id. at 598-600. On a radio program, LePage claimed the mural was too
“one-sided,” implying that the mural was too pro-labor, as the anonymous
complaint alleged the mural was “overwhelming, pro-labor, and anti-business.” Id.
at 598-599. In an interview, LePage alternatively claimed that his objection with
the mural was “simply where the money [to fund the mural] came from.” Id. at
600. In a press release after the interview, members of the LePage administration
acknowledged they “originally removed the mural because of its messaging [as
being too pro-labor]” and “that it was then discovered how the mural was funded”
which further supported the decision to remove the mural. Id. at 600.
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violations.97
In analyzing the nature of the mural speech, the First Circuit
identified that the First Amendment protects artistic expression.98 The
court dismissed the idea that the MDOL anteroom was a public forum99 and
then outlined the authority granted by the Government Speech Doctrine to
the government or a governmental unit: the right of association with the
message of the mural,100 the right to remove offensive artwork,101 the right
to consider the use of the space in which the artwork is displayed,102 and
the right of an administration to display its own message.103 Ultimately, the
First Circuit concluded that the mural was government speech and that
while the removal of the mural may be controversial, dissatisfaction with
the decision could be voiced through the voting process, not by prohibiting
LePage from taking the mural down.104
Newton exemplifies an inherent difficulty underlying the Government
Speech Doctrine: when does government involvement with speech make
that speech government speech?105 Although the Court never explicitly
outlines the boundaries and policy considerations underlying the
Government Speech Doctrine,106 the boundaries of the Doctrine implied by
the Supreme Court make its application to justify the removal of public art
from public space improper.
C. Analyzing the Government Speech Doctrine:
Control and Association
At its core, the Government Speech Doctrine is the Court’s attempt to
navigate the tension between the competing policies of the government’s
need to control its own messages and private, individual free speech
rights.107 Where the government acts in a more functional capacity such as
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id. at 601.
99. Id. at 602.
100. Id.
101. Newton, 700 F.3d at 603.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See Id. at 604.
105. See id. at 602.
106. Id. at 603
107. Newton, 700 F.3d at 602
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a service provider, the Court has permitted the government to disseminate a
particular message.108 Contrarily, where the government moves beyond the
realm of functionality and encroaches into the realm of idea suppression,
the Court has scrutinized the government activity under a classic free
speech analysis.109
Determining where the government ceases to be functional and
becomes suppressive is difficult, with the Court acknowledging that
situations exist where “it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is
speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”110
Because of this difficulty, the Court has had reservations in creating a rigid
analytical framework with regards to the Government Speech Doctrine,
stating instead that the government may not “leverage its power to award
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored
viewpoints” or “impose . . . a disproportionate burden calculated to drive
‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”111 The subsections
below address the issue of the proper scope of the Government Speech
Doctrine when the government performs a functional role as a provider, be
it through the provision of funds for speech or through space for speaking.
1. The Boundaries of the Government Speech Doctrine
The first guidepost established in Rust v. Sullivan shows that the
government may condition the receipt of funds on certain speech
restrictions when performing a functional role as a service provider.112 The
ability of the government to allocate resources based on certain speech
restrictions was further articulated in later Government Speech Doctrine
cases such as Finley and Pleasant Grove, although the Court resisted

108. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 179 (providing funds for family planning

services).
109. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (prohibiting the University of
Virginia from prohibiting the publication of a magazine based on the content of the
magazine).
110. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
111. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
112. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475
(1977)). Programs receiving Title X funding were also not completely barred from
engaging in pro-abortion or abortion-related speech. The Court distinguished Rust
from completely barring an otherwise constitutionally protected right to engage in
such speech because “[t]he regulations do not force the Title X grantee, or its
employees, to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that such
activities be kept separate and distinct from . . . the Title X project.” Id. at 175
(emphasis in original).
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granting the Government complete control over a message just because the
government provided funds or space for that message.113 For instance, in
Finley, the Court upheld the NEA’s decency standard to receive funding so
long as the NEA did not “leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis
of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.”114 In a
logically parallel decision in Pleasant Grove, the Court permitted Pleasant
Grove City to reject displaying a privately created sculpture in one of its
parks, but, like Finley, couched its assertion by also stating that “the
government does not have a free hand to regulate private speech on
government property.”115
The second guidepost, on the opposite end of the spectrum, shows the
government can lose the ability to control speech it funds when the funds
allocated indiscriminately support individual, private speech, rather than a
direct government message.116 In Rosenberger, the Court found that by
subsidizing student activities, the University of Virginia had created a
limited public forum from which it could not impermissibly exclude certain
viewpoints.117 In Pico, the Court gave weight to a school board’s
preliminary decision to embrace or reject certain ideas contained in books,
but drew the line at allowing the school to later remove said books from the
library because it decided after the books’ placement, that it disagreed with
the books’ points of view.118 This resistance to allowing the government to
“unring the bell” when it funds private speech is also implied in
Rosenberger.119 There, the Court did not allow the University of Virginia
to deny funding to a student group when the very reason the group had
access to the funds was because the University allowed the group to
113. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587; Summum, 555 U.S. at 468–69.
114. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
115. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468–69.
116. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 864.
117. Id. at 837; see Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (stating that conditioning the
receipt of funds on certain speech limitations has been upheld in a variety of
contexts by the Supreme Court); see, e.g., Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 196
(holding that “[w]hen the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program, it is entitled to broadly define that program’s limits”); cf. Pico, 457 U.S.
at 871–72 (finding that while libraries have the ability to choose what books to add
to their collection, “local school boards may not remove books from school library
shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books”).
118. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 873. Pico, however, does not stand for the
assertion that a governmental body cannot change its mind, stating that “criteria
that appear on their face to be permissible” may be an appropriate basis for action
such as reversing a previous decision.
119. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-24, 834, 837.
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register as a student group.120 Between these two very broad guideposts is
a wide swath of gray.
2. The Implicit Policy Considerations of
the Government Speech Doctrine
While the Court never states it explicitly, the proximity of the
government allocation of funding or space to the functional role of the
government as a provider of resources influences the amount of control the
Court allots the government over the speech in question. Whether the
government is acting within this functional role as a provider of resources
as opposed to encroaching on private, individual free speech rights turns on
two implicit considerations: namely, the association between the
government and the speech in question, and the amount of control the
government exercised over said speech.
First, one of the Court’s primary concerns with regard to the ability
of the government to regulate governmentally funded or supported speech
is the association between the government and the speech in question.121
Rust marks the most straightforward application of this theory that the more
the government will be associated with the speech in question, the more the
government can control that speech, with the Court stating that “when the
government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to
define the limits of that program.”122 This idea makes perfect sense, as
when the government acts within its functional role as a provider of
services, the public will inherently associate that service with the
government.
This sort of “association with the government equals control by the
government” mentality is reinforced in Pleasant Grove, where the Court
found that when the speech in question was in a form classically associated
with the government123 and would be displayed on land “closely identified
in the public mind with the government unit that owns the land,” the
government had the ability to regulate the speech in question.124 In the
120. See id.
121. Oddly, although the Court never embraced the Souter concurrence in
Pleasant Grove where he suggested that “the best approach that occurs to me is to
ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the
expression to be government speech,” the Court seems to be doing just that in a
less direct way. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 487 (2009).
122. See Rust, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
123. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
124. Id. at 472. This logic is consistent with concerns articulated in
Rosenberger where the Court found that “when the state is the speaker, it may
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alternative, where the government is perceived as merely “encourag[ing] a
diversity of views from private speakers,” the risk of association is
diminished, and as such, the Court has shown trepidation in allowing the
government to exercise control over said speech via the Government
Speech Doctrine.125
The second concern that the Court indirectly focuses on when
determining the amount of latitude the government may have when
regulating speech is control. Rosenberger highlights an instance where a
governmental unit gave up control of the speech it aimed to regulate and, as
a result, forfeited the ability to regulate that speech.126 Whereas in Rust, the
government had a clear objective and aim for the allocation of Title X
funding,127 in Rosenberger, that clarity of objective was not present. While
the initial decision to label a group as an independent student organization
(and thus make the group eligible to request University funds) rested with a
governmental unit, once that threshold was passed, funding was allocated
indiscriminately.128 In Finley, the NEA’s goal was to fund art that
encouraged “artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to . . .
creative and cultural diversity.”129 Unlike Rosenberger where the Court did
not grant the government the ability to regulate private speech, the Court
granted the NEA a narrow authority to approve grant requests under the
make content-based choices.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The Court, though
not expressly stating it, has expanded that concern articulated in Rosenberger to a
broader assumption that when “the state is the speaker” or the state is perceived as
the speaker, then it should be able to regulate the speech in question.
125. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
126. See id. at 837.
127. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475
(1977)). Programs receiving Title X funding were also not completely barred from
engaging in pro-abortion or abortion-related speech. The Court distinguished Rust
from completely barring an otherwise constitutionally protected right to engage in
such speech because “[t]he regulations do not force the Title X grantee, or its
employees, to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that such
activities be kept separate and distinct from . . . the Title X project” (emphasis in
original). Id. at 175.
128. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823–24. It was the indiscriminate access
to funding that led the court to find that the University had created a limited public
forum. Id. at 829. This unrestricted access for funding should not be thought of as
the only reason that the Court was willing to find that a limited public forum was
created by the University. For instance, college campuses are thought of as classic
public forums, so the location of the funding source on a university campus and
through a university agent are relevant. See supra Part I.A.
129. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (citing National Foundation on the
Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 954 (2006)).
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“decency and respect” standard promulgated by the 1990 amendment to the
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act.130
The distinction between Rosenberger and Finley and the ultimate
divergence in the outcomes of the two cases is subtle but important. First,
in Finley, access to funding was competitive, so a limited public forum was
not created by the allocation of resources because the resources were not
made available indiscriminately.131 Second, the competitive nature of the
funding132 allowed the NEA to retain some amount of control over the
allocation of funds by asserting the authority to take standards of “decency
and respect” into account when determining how to allocate funding.133
The amount of control the government seems to retain over the
content of speech it funds seems to be inversely proportional to the breadth
of the speech in question. For example, in Rust, the government retained a
high level of control over a narrow type of speech aimed at promoting
preventative family planning.134 Alternatively, in Finley, the government
retained only a thin ability to regulate a broad type of speech.135 When the
government or a governmental unit exercises its control and allows a
certain type of speech, the Court has shown hesitation in allowing that unit
to then “unring the bell” and re-exercise control over said speech without
having guidelines in place.136 With these considerations in mind, this
Article now turns to the mutable nature of art speech.

130. See id.
131. While it is tempting to argue that obtaining status as a CIO in
Rosenberger is a form of competition to get access to funds, the comparison would
be improper. Based on university policy, “CIO status is available to any group the
majority of whose members are students, whose managing officers are fulltime
students, and that complies with certain procedural requirements.” See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823. This process is much less rigorous than receiving
an NEA grant.
132. See 20 U.S.C. § 954. This amendment to the Act was implemented in
response to a number of public criticisms on the use of NEA grants to fund two
shows: one, a retrospective of works by Robert Mapplethorpe containing
homoerotic images; and the other, a work by Andres Serrano called “Piss Christ.”
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 574.
133. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 569.
134. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 189.
135. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 582 (explaining how the NEA only identifies
the broadest funding priorities). The Act created a “broadly conceived national
policy of support for the . . . arts in the United States.” 20 U.S.C § 953(b). The
Act also pledged federal funds to “help create and sustain . . . a climate
encouraging . . . the release of creative talent.” Id. § 951(7).
136. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 871–72.
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III. THE MUTABLE NATURE OF ART SPEECH
There is an inherent tension between the Government Speech
Doctrine and the nature of art speech. The courts in the cases discussed
above showed no hesitation in classifying art as government speech.
However, defining the nature of the art speech never expanded beyond that
very basic classification. This Article proposes that defining art speech as
government speech is not that simple. Art has been a central and
contentious area of discourse since the start of written history. What is the
function of art? What is the form of art? What meaning does art convey?
Great thinkers since the time of the ancient Greeks have attempted to
answer these questions,137 and while there is little consensus as to the
answers, an underlying consistency rests with the idea that the meaning and
purpose of art is mutable.
A. The Meaning of Art Speech Changes Based on Individual Perspective
This Section begins with the Supreme Court’s recognition that
individual perspective shapes the way in which art is perceived.138
Although this theory known as Perspectivism did not arise until the
nineteenth century, its foundation arose much earlier in human history.139
Because the theories surrounding modern art theory go so far back in time,
it is appropriate to give a brief history of the progression of philosophical
thought as it relates to art. This discussion’s purpose is to give context to
art theory in its present state and to show that cultural influences shape
individual perspectives on art.
Art theory originates in the time of the ancient Greeks.140 Plato and
Aristotle suggested the original foundation of art theory, believing in
mimesis, the idea that art imitated life.141 The idea of mimesis percolated
through time and influenced the philosophers of the Middle Ages who,
while accepting mimesis, attributed the functions, forms, and meaning of

137. See infra Part II.A.
138. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 475 (2009)
(admitting “text-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts
and sentiments in the minds of different observers and the effect of monuments
that do not contain text is likely to be even more variable”).
139. See infra Part II.A.
140. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POETICS 2 (Albert K. Whitaker ed., Joe Sachs
trans., Focus Publ’g/R Pullinas Co., 2006).
141. Id.
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art to God, rather than an underlying ideal or truth, such as beauty.142 The
Enlightenment embraced the idea of beauty, formalizing it in the new
concept known as aesthetics, which divided the basis for making a
judgment about art into seeing the object and regarding one’s
contemplations on the object in question.143
However, not all
Enlightenment thinkers embraced the concept of aesthetics, leading to the
dawn of the psychoanalytical movement, which gave way to a more
individualized inquiry into why art is created and what purpose it serves.144
The onset of the twentieth century brought with it a rapid acceleration
in the changing perspective of the artistic landscape.145 This happened
through several poignant artistic movements.146 This rapid fluctuation in
art movements highlights how cultural influences shape individual
perspectives on art. The pre-Christian Greeks attributed the meaning of art
to an ideal of beauty, while the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages
associated the meaning of art with God.147 As twentieth century society
began to change more rapidly following the Industrial Revolution, artistic
movements came and went more quickly.148
From Plato to Freud, to the rapidly shifting art landscape of the
twentieth century, the mutable nature of art is implied rather than directly
addressed. Starting in the 1930s, writers and philosophers more directly
addressed the mutable nature of art.149 Developing off the dual nature of
142. See e.g., ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS (Henry Chadwick trans., 1992).
According to St. Augustine of Hippo, God was the ideal of beauty, and thus the
closer art was to God, the more perfect its function, form, and content. This
closeness to God was in turn defined, in some degree, by the object’s closeness to
its proper place in the world.
143. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, Critique of Judgment, in 42 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 87, 88 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
144. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 20
(Adam Phillips ed., David McLintock trans., 2002); compare KANT, supra note
143, at 87, with JEAN- JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The First Discourse: Discourse on the
Sciences and Arts, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND
DISCOURSES 43, 50-51 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002).
145. See, e.g., FRED S. KLEINER & HELEN GARDNER, GARDNER’S ART
THROUGH THE AGES: THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE 700, 703, 710, 749, 759 (Sharon
Adams Poore, ed., 13th ed. 2010) (analyzing the different stylistic and conceptual
elements of artistic movements throughout the twentieth century).
146. See, e.g., id.
147. See, e.g., id.
148. See, e.g., id.
149. There are books that predate the 1930s with regards to the principles of
art theory, but relationships between the individual and the interpretation of art did
not blossom or become widely accepted in the United States until the 1930s. For
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aesthetics proposed during the Enlightenment,150 writers such as John
Dewey greatly expanded on the idea that art is interpreted as an experience
to an object—an experience that is informed by a myriad of external
influences.151 Dewey suggested that the interaction of man and the
environment is the “[only] foundation upon which [a]esthetic theory and
criticism can build”152 and stressed that the focus on art should not be on
the “expressive object,” meaning the physical art object, but rather on the
“experience” that “expressive object” generates.153 According to Dewey, a
number of considerations exist when analyzing an individual’s reaction to a
piece of artwork, including the nature of the “expressive object”154 and the
common substance of an artwork that influences our interpretation.155 This
idea that an individual’s reaction to a piece of artwork is defined by a
multitude of experiences, including the nature of the object and the various
substances of the artwork, has been accepted and further expanded to
include the idea that the viewer must actively seek and inject meaning into
the work he or she views:
You cannot look at a picture and find it beautiful by a merely
passive act of seeing. The internal relations that make it
beautiful to you have to be discovered and in some way have to
be put in by you. The artist provides a skeleton; he provides
guiding lines; he provides enough to engage your interests and

early examples of the development of art theory, see HEINRICH WOLFFLIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF ART HISTORY: THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STYLE
IN LATER ART (M.D. Hottinger trans., Dover Publ’ns 6th ed. 1952) (1932)
(devising a method of analyzing artistic styles through the use of line, plane, form
and unity).
150. See KANT, supra note 143, at 42.
151. See JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 82-83 (1980).
152. Id. at 220.
153. Id. at 86. While Dewey builds off of the structure proposed by Kant
that art is experienced via a reaction to an object, his theories stand in opposition to
Kant in important ways. Compare KANT, supra note 143, at 87, with DEWEY,
supra note 151, at 82.
154. See DEWEY, supra note 151, at 23. Dewey suggests that nature of the
“expressive object” is so important because our minds want to be challenged,
stating “like the soil, the mind is fertilized while it lies fallow, until a new burst of
bloom ensues.”
155. Id. These substances include the means and end of an artwork (defining
the means of artwork as an aesthetic journey undertaken for “the delight of moving
about and seeing what we see”) and the spatial/temporal qualities of an artwork
(describing these conditions as “general conditions without which an experience is
not possible”).
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touch you emotionally. But there is no picture and no poem
unless you yourself enter it and fill it out.156
Our individual perspective is shaped by personal experience and
cultural influences.157 Modern psychology also supports the idea that the
nature of the “expressive object” changes our experience and interpretation
with the object in question.158 Various factors which influence our
interpretation of an artwork include the level of abstraction159 of the
object,160 complexity of the work,161 personality type,162 lighting
direction,163 symmetry,164 and compositional balance.165
156. Lloyd E. Sandelands & Georgette C. Buckner, Of Art and Work:
Aesthetic Experience and the Psychology of Work Feelings, 11 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 105, 115 (1989).
157. See JOHN BERGER ET AL., WAYS OF SEEING 8 (1972) (giving the
example that individuals interpreted fire to be representative of hell in medieval
paintings, while such an association is not made in modern times).
158. See id. (giving the example that individuals interpreted fire to be
representative of hell in medieval paintings, while such an association is not made
in modern times); accord Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic et al., Personality
Predictors of Artistic Preferences as a Function of the Emotional Valence and
Perceived Complexity of Paintings, 4 PSYCHOL. OF AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY, AND
THE ARTS 196, 198 (suggesting that reactions and interpretations of art are
influenced by a myriad of factors including age, gender and personality).
159. See Mark J. Landau et al., Windows into Nothingness: Terror
Management, Meaninglessness, and Negative Reactions to Modern Art, 90 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 879, 880 (2006) (explaining how modern
abstract art is unique in its explicit abandonment of any representational
intentions).
160. See id. at 881 (arguing that humans, being aware of their own mortality,
seek to derive meaning from reality and thus dislike abstract art because it lacks an
easily recognizable meaning).
161. See R.M. Nicki & Virginia Moss, Preference for Non-Representational
Art as a Function of Various Measures of Complexity, 29 CAN. J. PSYCHOL. 237,
240-241 (1975) (finding that with regards to abstract artwork, people, to an extent,
prefer more visually complicated works).
162. See Adrian Furnham & John Walker, Personality and Judgments of
Abstract, Pop Art, and Representational Paintings, 15 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 57, 58
(2001) (finding one’s personality type can be predictive of what kind of art one
will like).
163. See David. A. McDine et al., Lateral Biases in Lighting of Abstract
Work, 16 LATERALITY: ASYMMETRIES OF BODY, BRAIN AND COGNITION 268, 270
(2012) (finding left-side top-down lighting to be most visually appealing to
viewers).
164. See Ingo Rentschler et al., Innate and Learned Components of Human
Visual Preference, 9 CURRENT BIOLOGY 665, 670 (1999) (finding people naturally
find symmetrical images more beautiful and appealing).
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The mutable nature of art at an individual level is supported by
history,166 art theorists, and modern psychology.167 Some of the most
prominent thinkers in western civilization, dating back to ancient Greeks,
disagreed over the seemingly simple questions of the purpose and meaning
of art.168 Does art reflect beauty? God? Vanity? The desire to escape
reality? How much of our reaction to art is predicated on personal
experience and our inherent psychological reactions to the qualities of the
artwork in question? The answers to these questions, as discussed above,
do not have a singular answer and change based on cultural context and
individual perspective. As suggested at the beginning of Part II, this
mutable nature of art speech puts it at tension with analysis under the
Government Speech Doctrine. How can a court label the message
conveyed by an artwork as government speech when the message being
conveyed changes based on individual perspective shaped by societal
context and personal experience?
B. The Meaning of Art Speech Changes
Based on Spatial and Temporal Context
Analysis of art speech under the Government Speech Doctrine is
further complicated by the fact that the message art speech conveys mutates
based on spatial and temporal contexts.169 The art discussed in this Section
focus on public art and divides public art into three categories: (1) classic
public art, which references themes such as national identity, civic pride,
and historical figures; (2) blended public art, which reinterprets or utilizes
classic public art themes in new ways; and (3) non-blended public art,

165. See Annukka K. Lindell & Julia Mueller, Can Science Account for
Taste? Psychological Insights into Art Appreciation, 23 J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
453, 460 (2011) (finding balanced compositions are more visually appealing to
viewers).
166. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 475 (admitting “text-based monuments are
almost certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different
observers and the effect of monuments that do not contain text is likely to be even
more variable”).
167. See Nicki & Moss, supra note 161, at 237-238 (finding that with
regards to abstract artwork, people, to an extent, prefer more visually complicated
works).
168. See Furnham & Walker, supra note 162, at 58 (explaining
psychological studies over the years with respect to the different ideas about
purpose and meaning of art).
169. See DEWEY, supra note 151, at 82.
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which generally abandons the iconography utilized by classic public art.170
The focus on public art in this Section reflects this Article’s broader focus
on the inapplicability of the Government Speech Doctrine to the removal of
public art from public display.
With regard to classic public art, governments have historically used
monuments to speak:
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have
erected statues of themselves to remind their subjects of their
authority and power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other
monuments have been built to commemorate military victories
and sacrifices and other events of civic importance. A
monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed as a
means of expression.171
Examples of this kind of classic public art include the Marine Corps War
Memorial,172 the Vietnam War Memorial,173 and the Washington
Monument.174
Despite the use of such classic monuments, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the meaning of such art can change based on context
and/or over time.175 Considering context, the Court noted that “[t]he
message that a government entity conveys by allowing a monument to
remain on its property may also be altered by the subsequent addition of
other monuments in the same vicinity.”176 With regard to time, the Court
170. These categories are unique to this Article and will be discussed below.
See infra Part IV.B.
171. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
172. George Washington, NAT’L PARKS SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/gwmp/planyourvisit/usmc_memorial.htm (last updated Apr.
26, 2014) (Created to commemorate “the Marine dead of all wars and their
comrades of other services who fell fighting beside them.”).
173. Vietnam Veterans, NAT’L PARKS SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/vive/index.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2014) (“Honoring the
men and women who served in the controversial Vietnam War, the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial chronologically lists the names of more than 58,000 Americans
who gave their lives in service to their country.”)..
174. Washington Monument, NAT’L PARKS SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/wamo/index.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2014) (explaining that
the monument honors the nation’s founding father, George Washington). It should
be noted that some privately raised funds were used in the completion of the
Washington Monument. Washington Monument, NAT’L PARKS SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/wash/dc72.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
175. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 477.
176. See id.
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further noted that “[the Statue of Liberty] was given to the [United States of
America] by the Third French Republic to express Republican solidarity
and friendship between the two countries. . . . Only later did the statue
come to be viewed as a beacon of welcoming immigrants to the land of
freedom.”177 However, publicly funded art speech is not limited to these
kinds of classic public art.
Blended public art, unlike classic public art, combines contemporary
ideas of context and time with classic public art subject matter.178 A good
example of this blending is Tatzu Nishi’s publicly funded179 “Discovering
Columbus.” With “Discovering Columbus,” Nishi “built a convincingly
appointed penthouse-worthy space around [a] 13-foot-high marble
sculpture of Columbus.”180 To access the work, visitors climbed six flights
of stairs where, upon ascending, they were greeted by both the statue and a
well-lit apartment complete with “hardwood floors, area rugs, cushy
couches and armchairs, art reproductions, lots of reading material and a
remote-free, 55-inch Samsung television screen.”181 The purpose of the
installation was to change the public’s perception of the historic statue,
which normally sat upon a column seventy-five feet tall, by changing our
contextual relationship to the piece and “invit[ing] us to discover where the
imagination may lead.”182
Non-blended public art, by contrast, generally deviates from the
classic purposes of public art because it does not utilize the predominate
themes of classic public art. A prominent early example of non-blended
public art is The Chicago Picasso, a fifty-foot abstract sculpture that
combines imagery of an afghan dog and a woman.183 The abstracted nature
177. See id.
178. The term “blended public art” is unique to this Article and will be
discussed below. See infra Part IV.A.
179. Though the project is funded through the Public Arts Fund, it is not one
hundred percent publicly funded. For a list of all the private sponsors, see Tatzu
Nishi: Discovering Columbus, PUBLIC ARTS FUND,
http://www.publicartfund.org/view/exhibitions/5495_discovering_columbus (Apr.
25, 2014). For images of “Discovering Columbus,” see infra App., illus. 2 & 3.
180. Roberta Smith, At His Penthouse, a Tête-à-Tête With Columbus, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/arts/design/tatzunishis-discovering-columbus-installation.html.
181. Id.
182. PUBLIC ARTS FUND, supra note 179.
183. Alan G. Artner, Chicago’s Picasso Sculpture, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 15,
1967) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-chicagodays-picassostory,0,1344585.story. For an image of the Chicago Picasso, see infra App., illus.
4.
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of the sculpture made it stand in stark contrast to the majority of public art
in Chicago, which primarily portrayed historical figures.184 According to
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, the precise purpose of erecting the
sculpture, which contrasted so greatly from the context of the surrounding
public art,185 was to celebrate “the belief that what is strange to us today
will be familiar tomorrow.”186 While the purpose of the statue may have
been to promote an awareness of new art forms in a city known for its
classic public art, reactions were not positive.187 Over time, the city of
Chicago embraced modern public art and commissioned works by artists
such as Alexander Calder188 and Jean DuBuffet.189 Again, context and time
changed the meaning of the Chicago Picasso. Originally the message the
sculpture conveyed was controversial because it was so contextually
different,190 but as time passed its message became less contentious and
morphed into one that encouraged the city of Chicago to embrace modern
art.191
Other examples of public artworks that have a contextual meaning are
Cloud Gate (more famously known as the “Chicago Bean”), an abstract
sculpture by the artist Anish Kapoor that sits in Millennium Park in
Chicago,192 and the Work Project Administration’s Federal Art Project
(“FAP”) murals. Cloud Gate’s highly polished surface reflects the Chicago
skyline, conveying a subtle civic message by incorporating the city itself
into the piece. This contextual proximity to the Chicago skyline helps
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Jyoti, Alexander Calder, CHICAGO OUTDOOR SCULPTURES, (Oct. 11,
2010, 7:19 AM), http://chicago-outdoorsculptures.blogspot.com/2011/01/alexander-calder.html.
189. Public Art in the Loop, CHOOSE CHICAGO,
http://www.choosechicago.com/articles/view/Public-Art-in-the-Loop/314/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2014).
190. Artner, supra note 183 (Various civic leaders reacted poorly to the
statue’s metamorphic message; the Mayor’s Deputy of Special Events
recommended that the city remove the statue and replace it with a statue of “Mr.
Cub . . . Ernie Banks.”).
191. Id. (discussing how the sculpture inspired other commissions and
eventually became as much a symbol of Chicago as the Water Tower).
192. See Millennium Park, CITY OF CHI.,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dca/supp_info/millennium_park.html
(last visited Apr. 25, 2014). For an image of Cloud Gate, see infra App., illus. 5.
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define the message the sculpture conveys. What sort of message would
Cloud Gate convey if it were positioned on the city’s waterfront instead?
The FAP murals, commissioned in the 1930s to employ artists during
the Great Depression, raise a similar question.193 Under FAP, artists across
the country created murals for public buildings, with the New York area
project director focusing specifically on funding abstract paintings.194
Artists such as Paul Kelpe received funding to create abstract murals for
the Williamsburg Housing Project’s social rooms because “these areas
were intended to provide a place of relaxation and entertainment for the
tenants” and “the more arbitrary color . . . enables the artist to place an
emphasis on [the] psychological potential to stimulate relaxation.” 195 Just
like Cloud Gate, the spatial context of the murals defined, to some degree,
the messages they conveyed because they were located in government
housing projects. What messages would the murals have conveyed if they
were painted on the exterior of a building or on a canvas hanging in a
museum?
C. The Mutable Nature of Art Speech Makes Analysis of Art
Under the Government Speech Doctrine Improper
When determining if government involvement in speech allows that
speech to fall into the scope of the Government Speech Doctrine, the Court
has considered the broad purpose of the Doctrine, the government’s
function as a service provider,196 and the two implicit policy considerations
of control and association.197 Thus, the discussion regarding the improper
application of the Government Speech Doctrine to art speech needs to
revolve around the tensions between the mutable nature of art speech and
the three considerations listed above.
First, although the Doctrine allows the government to retain control
over the message of the services it provides, this control is related to the

193. See, e.g., Francis V. O’Connor, New Deal Art Projects, in THE NEW
DEAL ART PROJECTS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF MEMOIRS 220, 227 (Francis V.
O’Connor ed. 1934).
194. See, e.g., id.
195. Francis V. O’Connor, Federal Art Projects, in ART FOR THE MILLIONS:
ESSAYS FROM THE 1930S AND ADMINISTRATORS OF THE WPA FEDERAL ARTS
PROJECT 46, 69 (Francis V. O’Connor ed. 1974). For an image of the murals, see
infra App., illus. 6.
196. See supra Part I.C.
197. See supra Part I.C.2.
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narrowness of the speech the government encourages.198 Encouraging art is
not a narrow service with a narrow message199 and therefore should not
trigger a broad amount of governmental control under the present scope of
the Government Speech Doctrine. Furthermore, once art is funded and
displayed, the implicit considerations of control and association become
more of an issue than the broader purpose and goal of the Doctrine, as the
purpose of the government to fund art has been achieved.
The amount of control the government retains over the speech in
question is an implicit but important consideration of the Government
Speech Doctrine.200 This issue, when considering publicly funded art, is
relevant in the preliminary parts of funding an art piece: choosing the
appropriate artist and art proposal, deciding where to display the artwork,
and displaying the artwork after observing the finished piece. The
government has ultimate control over these decisions which reflect the
government’s intent to convey some message through art, be it a focused
decision to convey the history of the Maine labor movement as seen in
Newton, or the broad decision by the NEA to fund art to create a “broadly
conceived national policy of support for the . . . arts in the United
States.”201 Once the government distributes funds to an artist and displays
artwork, it has exercised and exhausted its control over the speech in
question, and thus control consideration implied by the Court is not an
appropriate consideration with regards to the Government Speech Doctrine
and public art. While it is colorable that the government is still exercising
control over a piece of artwork in so far that it continues to provide space
for its display, that argument more logically fits within the second policy
consideration permeating the Government Speech Doctrine: association.202
Association, unlike control, is never exercised or exhausted, and
arises from implicit or explicit direct government involvement in the
speech.203 With publicly funded art, the mutable nature of art speech
198. See supra Part I.C.2.
199. For instance, the goal of the NEA is to create a “broadly conceived
national policy of support for the . . . arts in the United States” and pledge federal
funds to “help create and sustain . . . a climate encouraging . . . the release of
creative talent.” See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of
1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 953(b), 951(7) (2006).
200. See supra Part I.C.2.
201. 20 U.S.C. § 953(b).
202. See supra Part I.C.2.
203. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193; Summum, 555 U.S. at 470 (finding the
nature of speech in conjunction with the location of the speech to be sufficient to
create government speech).
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diminishes the risk of government association with the speech because
once art is displayed to the public, any message it conveys, be it the
intentional message of the artist or the government, begins to change. On
the individual level, this is because people react to the artwork differently
based on a multitude of factors that include personal experiences,204
cultural influences,205 and individual psychology.206 The mutable nature of
art speech, both individually and contextually, makes the ease with which
the courts label art speech as government speech seem unwarranted.207
How can the government purport to be speaking when any message it
intended to convey through the art it funds is constantly fluctuating outside
of its control? The fear that this question could be answered in favor of the
Government—that an artwork will be seen as an extension of government
policy rather than an individual expression of creative vision—has already
had chilling effects on the public art world.208
IV. ARTIST RIGHTS: MORAL RIGHTS & THE VISUAL RIGHTS ACT
Tension exists not only between the Government Speech Doctrine
and the nature of art speech, but also between the Doctrine and the latent
legal rights that exist with the creator of a piece of artwork. 209 Art
represents the expressive work of an individual and carries with it residual
rights, called moral rights, which exist with the creator of the work even
when ownership has been transferred.210 These rights developed to protect
the personal rather than economic interests of a copyright holder, and
evolved under the theory that the creators of any work have a personal
connection to the property they created.211 Moral rights exist within certain
204. See Sandelands & Bunker, supra note 156, at 115.
205. See supra Part II.A.
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 470 (claiming “[p]ermanent monuments
displayed on public property . . . represent government speech”).
208. Christo, one of the most well-known and prolific public artists of our
time, refuses to accept any public funding for his piece for fear that his vision and
artistic integrity will be compromised. See CHRISTO & JEANNE-CLAUDE,
http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/faq (search under “Who Pays for the
Installations?” and “Why Don’t they Accept Licensing Deals and Use that Money
on the Installations?” subheadings) (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
209. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (2013) (describing moral rights).
210. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J.
353, 369 (2006).
211. Moral rights have a strong basis in the “natural rights” philosophy of
property expounded by John Locke, who suggested that the ownership of property
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types of copyrightable work212 and include both rights of attribution213 and
rights of integrity.214 Common law moral rights have their roots in France
and Germany215 and were codified in the moral rights provision of the
Berne Convention in 1928.216 Classically, the United States has differed
from Continental Europe in so far that it did not recognize moral rights in
artworks.217 However, in recent years there has been a shift towards
recognizing moral rights in the United States.
Historically, the United States has not recognized the moral rights of
artists.218 At the local level, however, states began addressing the issue of

is derived from the effort exerted to create it. See generally, JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1690).
212. To be eligible for copyright protection, a work must be fixed in a
tangible medium, be original and contain some minimum amount of creativity.
See, e.g., Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 355, 358
(1991).
213. Rights of attribution ensure that “artists are correctly associated with the
works of art they create, and that they are not identified with works created by
others.” Pavia v. Ave. of the Am’s. Assoc’s., 901 F. Supp. 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (internal citation omitted). While rights of association are an important
aspect of moral rights, they are not of primary importance to this Article and will
not be discussed further.
214. Rights of integrity allow an artist “to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of [his or her] work which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation, and [that] any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right.” Mass. Museum of
Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2010)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)).
215. See Rigamonti, supra note 210, at 355-67 (discussing and comparing
Continental moral rights).
216. See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
217. Compare Rigamonti, supra note 210, with Philip B. Hallen, Local
Dispatch / Airport art is not always a pretty picture: The story of Calder’s
‘Pittsburgh,’ PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, (Jan. 4, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/morning-file/local-dispatch-airport-artis-not-always-a-pretty-picture-the-story-of-calders-pittsburgh-374554/ (looking at
Continental Europe’s treatment of artworks versus the Allegheny County’s
modification of the Alexander Calder sculpture “Pittsburgh”).
218. For instance, the 1958 Calder mobile “Pittsburgh” (which won the 1958
Carnegie Award for Sculpture at the 1958 Carnegie Art Exhibition) was donated to
the Allegheny County Airport and subsequently repainted, immobilized with
weights, and attached to a motor to force rotation of the piece without Calder’s
permission. See Hallen, supra note 217; see also Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1046 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the removal of Richard
Serra’s “Tilted Arc” from a Federal Plaza in New York City).
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moral rights as early as the 1970s.219 Moral rights were not codified on the
federal level until 1990 when Congress passed the Visual Artist Rights Act
(VARA).220 VARA grants authors of a work of visual art221 both rights of
attribution222 and rights of integrity,223 and these rights are conferred
regardless of whether the author of the work of visual art owns the
copyright to the work.224 However, these rights have their limitations. For
instance, protection under VARA extends only to a narrowly defined group
of works of visual art, lasts only for the life of the author, cannot be
transferred, and can be waived.225

219. Passed in 1979, the California Preservation of Works of Art Act was the
first piece of legislation to recognize artists’ moral rights. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
987 (West 2012). Other states followed in suit, such as New York in 1984. See,
e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2012) (providing moral
rights to artists).
220. See Visual Artist Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2013). It should be
noted that while VARA is part of the Copyright Act, a registered copyright is not
required to receive protection under VARA. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary
Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that “[b]eyond
the Copyright Act’s protection of certain economic rights, VARA provides
additional and independent protections to authors of works of visual art”).
221. A “work of visual art” is defined as “a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture” or “a still photographic image for exhibition purposes only.” See 17
U.S.C. § 101.
222. See id. §§ 106A(a)(1)–(2) (granting the author of a work of visual art
the right “to claim authorship of [a] work, and to prevent the use of his or her name
as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create” and to
“prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the
event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification [to] the work”).
223. Id. §§ 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B) (granting the author of a work of visual art
the right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
that work which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation . . . and to prevent
any destruction of a work of recognized stature”). It should be noted that “(t)he
modification of a work of visual art which is the result of . . . public presentation,
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification . . . unless the modification is caused by gross
negligence.” Id. § 106A(c)(2).
224. Id. § 106A(b).
225. Id. §§ 106A(d)–(e). Continental European moral rights, by comparison,
cannot be waived. See, e.g., Irma Sirvinskaite, Toward Copyright
“Europeanification”: European Union Moral Rights, 3 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L.
263, 286 (2010-2011).
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A. The Slow and Unpredictable Expansion of
Artist Rights Under VARA
One of the earliest and most cited cases to date on moral rights
granted under VARA is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., in which the
Second Circuit helped expand, to some degree, the scope of protection
offered to artists under VARA.226 In Carter, the manager of a commercial
building in Queens, New York contracted three artists to create a
walkthrough artwork containing multiple sculptural elements for the lobby
of the building.227 During the course of the contract, building ownership
changed hands and the new owners of the building wanted to remove the
artwork created by the three contracted artists.228 On appeal, the Second
Circuit upheld several findings of the lower court that expanded the rights
of artists under VARA.229 First, the Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s finding that multiple elements of an artwork that would not be
individually protectable could still constitute a “single, interrelated,
indivisible work of art.”230 Secondly, the Second Circuit rejected the
argument that because portions of the work of art were attached to the floor
and ceiling of the lobby, those elements were “applied art” and thus were
not considered “works of visual art” under VARA.231 These rulings,
though not groundbreaking, prevented the court from limiting VARA from
offering protection to single, free-standing sculptural forms.
While Carter may have constituted a limited victory for the
advancement of artist moral rights and a more expansive interpretation of
VARA, a full-fledged victory under the statute occurred in 1999 in the case
of Martin v. City of Indianapolis.232 The facts in Martin were fairly
unremarkable: a sculptor received permission from the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Development Commission to construct a large metal
sculpture on a piece of privately owned land.233 That land was later
226. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
227. Id. at 80.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id. at 77.
230. Id. at 84.
231. Id. at 85 (where the court found that “[i]interpreting applied art to
include [works attached to utilitarian objects such as floors or ceilings] would
render meaningless VARA’s protection for works of visual art installed in
buildings”).
232. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999).
233. See id.
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acquired by the city of Indianapolis and the sculpture was destroyed.234
The artist filed suit for a violation of VARA and ultimately prevailed.235
The primary hurdle faced in Martin was proving that the sculpture in
question was a work of “recognized stature,”236 which the Seventh Circuit
allowed to be proven via newspaper and magazine articles.237 The fact that
the Seventh Circuit did not require expert testimony to prove “recognized
stature” was extremely important because requiring expert testimony would
have made litigation under VARA prohibitively expensive for most
artists.238
Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc. marked another instance
where the courts expanded artist protection offered under VARA.239 In
Flack, a non-profit organization commissioned an artist to create a bronze
sculpture of Queen Catherine of Braganza.240 Clay sculptures and molds
were created in preparation for casting the piece in bronze, but a series of
controversies surrounding the statue and contract renegotiations delayed
the completion of the project.241 Because of the delay in the project, the
molds created for the bronze casting became damaged and were improperly
repaired by an assistant.242 The non-profit organization sought to go ahead
with casting the ill-repaired head and, after a temporary restraining order
was filed which prevented the organization from casting the head, sought to
destroy the original clay sculpture from which the molds were created.243
Rejecting the non-profit’s claim that the clay sculpture was a model
and thus did not warrant VARA protection, the Court found that,
“‘[c]ommon sense’ and the ‘generally accepted standards of the artistic
community’” dictated that sculptures created in preparation of completion
234. Id. at 611.
235. Id. at 610-11.
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2013). VARA provides that “the author of a
work of visual art . . . shall have the right . . . to prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature.”
237. Martin, 192 F.3d at 613.
238. Id. at 613 (The Seventh Circuit agreed that exclusion of expert
testimony was correct and held that the testimony was not necessary to satisfy the
“recognized stature” requirement of VARA.).
239. See Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 530.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 531.
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of a larger project were “preliminary works,” rather than models and were
“unquestionably covered by VARA.”244 While other portions of the artist’s
claim failed (discussed below), the language of VARA was expanded to
offer greater protection to works of visual art not explicitly listed in the
statute.245
Perhaps the two most successful suits brought under VARA were
actually settled during the course of litigation, showing the Act’s potential
strength as a lever to enforce moral rights. The first such case, Cort v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., came out of San Francisco in 1998.246 In
Cort, the city of San Francisco commissioned an artist to create a mural on
the side of a building in the Mission District.247 Twelve years later, the
building was sold, the mural was covered, and the children of the artist
sued under both VARA and the California Artist Protection Act (“CAPA”),
alleging that the mural was modified or destroyed without the artist’s
consent.248 Rather than litigate the case, the owners of the building decided
to purchase the mural from the city for $200,000.249 The second such case
to show the leveraging power of VARA involves another muralist, Kent
Twitchell, and his massive mural of Ed Ruscha.250 The mural, which was
completed in 1978 and located on the side of a federally owned building,
was completely painted over in 2006.251 The artist brought suit under both
VARA and CAPA against the United States government and eleven other
defendants, and the case was eventually settled out of court for $1.1

244. Id. at 534.
245. See also Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel,
593 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that “[VARA] . . . must be read to protect
unfinished, but ‘fixed,’ works of art that, if completed, would qualify for protection
under the statute”).
246. See Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.

2002).
247. Id. at 982.
248. Id.
249. Id. It is questionable if the suit under VARA would have been
sustained had the case not settled, as VARA rights only last for the life of the artist
and by the time of the lawsuit the original artist had died; see also 17 U.S.C. §
106A(d)(1) (2013).
250. Diane Haithman, Artist Kent Twitchell Settles Suit over Disappearing
Mural, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-et-twitchell12008may01,0,2393553.story [hereinafter Artist Kent Twitchell Settles Suit].
251. See id.; Diane Haithman, Kent Twitchell: Once, There Were Murals,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-twitchell22009apr02,0,6227244.story [hereinafter Once, There Were Murals].
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million, the largest settlement ever obtained under VARA.252
While these cases highlight some of the expansive readings by the
courts in expanding protection to artists under VARA, litigation under the
act has been a mixed bag. For instance, some courts have narrowly
construed the subject matter that is considered a work of visual art under
VARA.253 VARA also includes an exception to protection for works made
for hire,254 a classification some courts have been generous in applying.255
Although courts have shown some willingness to expansively interpret
works considered works of visual art under VARA, they have shown strong
resistance to reading other kinds of moral rights in VARA.256
For instance, the suggestion that VARA encompasses the right of
divulgation257 was expressly rejected by the First Circuit,258 as was the
argument that VARA protects site-specific works of visual art from site
relocation in the Fifth Circuit.259 Lastly, in some jurisdictions VARA has
252. See Artist Kent Twitchell Settles Suit, supra note 250.
253. See, e.g., Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Prods., Inc., No. 92 C 1055, 1992
WL 168836, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1992) (finding that “VARA does not include
puppets, costumes, or sets, which arguably may be considered ‘visual art’” or
provide “the performance of puppet shows” protection for those works). This
narrow interpretation of protected works of visual art speaks more of a judicial
trepidation to read VARA broadly rather than an inherent weakness in the statute.
For instance, puppets could very easily be considered “sculpture,” which is
protected by VARA, and stage sets could, without much stretching, be considered
paintings, which are also protected by VARA. Accord Patricia Alexander,
Comment, Moral Rights in the VARA Era, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1471, 1479 (2004).
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3).
255. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77, 86-88 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
factors such as the performance of additional labor tasks and the tax treatment of
the artists weighed in favor of finding the artists’ works of visual art to be works
made for hire and thus not eligible for VARA protection).
256. See, e.g., Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel,
593 F.3d. 38, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding VARA to protect unfinished but “fixed”
sculptures); but see Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st
Cir. 2006) (noting that VARA does not apply to site-specific works).
257. The right of divulgation gives “the artist the right to decide when (and
whether) the work [of visual art] is complete and can be shown.” Amy M. Adler,
Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 268 (2009). For a thorough
discussion and comparison of Continental moral rights, see Rigamonti, supra note
210.
258. See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 62 (stating “we decline to interpret VARA to
include such a claim [of] a separate moral right of disclosure [when] . . . Congress
explicitly limited the statute’s coverage to the rights of attribution and integrity”).
259. See Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 at143 (holding that
“[t]here is no basis for [the] claim that VARA [protects] . . . site-specific art”).
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been detrimental, preempting state laws that might otherwise offer broader
protection to artists.260
B. Artist Moral Rights Make the Application of the
Government Speech Doctrine to Publicly Displayed Art Improper
The concept that publicly funded, publicly displayed art can be
regulated via the Government Speech Doctrine is improper not only
because of the nature of art speech but also because of the moral rights of
an artist.261 This concept arises from the idea that public art should remain
on public display because of an artist’s right of integrity and the ill-defined
scopes of both moral rights and the Government Speech Doctrine
encourages wasteful litigation when public art is removed from public
display.262
First, public art should remain on public display because failing to do
so is very possibly a violation of an artist’s right of integrity. Removing
public art likely violates an artist’s right of integrity because, although the
work has not been physically mutilated or altered, it has been
constructively destroyed by being made inaccessible to the viewing public.
While no case has ever held explicitly that a publicly inaccessible piece of
art has been constructively destroyed, functionally equivalent cases
involving reversibly damaged murals that could be made available to the
public again have settled out-of-court for large sums of money.263 While
VARA does not protect site-specific art from being relocated,264 the
removal of art from public display is distinguishable from relocated art
because relocated art is still available for public viewing. People also have
a constitutional right to have access to “receive information and ideas,”
including ideas conveyed by art.265
260. See e.g., Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New
York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
2003) (finding that VARA preempted New York law).
261. Compare supra Part I.C. (discussing the government speech doctrine),
with 17. U.S.C. § 106(A) (defining artist moral rights).
262. See, e.g., Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 600 (1st Cir. 2012)
(describing a lawsuit against the governor of Maine for removing a mural from the
Maine Department of Labor); see also Artist Kent Twitchell Settles Suit, supra note
250.
263. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 311 F.3d at 982; see also
Once, There Were Murals, supra note 251.
264. See Phillips, 459 F.3d at 143.
265. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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Second, by ignoring moral rights when discussing the Government
Speech Doctrine as it relates to art, the courts merely encourage litigation
by artists and the waste of resources.266 Although slow and unpredictable,
moral rights have been expanded under VARA to include preparatory work
for art projects267 and unfinished works that exist in fixed form.268 The
government, as a speaker, patron, and subsidizer, has the right to
disseminate particular viewpoints.269 The artist, as a creator, also has rights
that permeate the works of visual art he or she creates.270 Because of the
inherent tensions between these rights and the nature of art speech, the
Government Speech Doctrine should not govern the removal of publicly
funded, publicly displayed art. Rather, as discussed below, the regulation
of publicly funded, publicly displayed art speech should be analyzed
through an equitable balancing test that considers the various elements
discussed in the analysis so far.
V. A MODEL STATUTE FOR THE REMOVAL OF PUBLICLY FUNDED ART
A. The Proposed Statute
State and federal governments should adopt legislation that outlines
an appropriate process for removing publicly funded art from public
display and takes into consideration the rights of the government to control
its own speech, individual free speech rights, and artist moral rights.
Rather than rely on courts to determine the appropriate scope of the
Government Speech Doctrine with regards to these interests, a model
statute that deals specifically with this issue could add much needed clarity
to this area of the law and dissuade litigation. The statute reads:
PROPOSED STATUTE SECTION ___; REMOVAL OF PUBLICLY FUNDED,
PUBLICLY DISPLAYED WORKS OF VISUAL ART
(a) DEFINITIONS
“Public(ly) Display(ed)” shall mean a work of visual art which
is viewable to the general public in either a general or limited
266. See, e.g., Artist Kent Twitchell Settles Suit, supra note 250; see also
Once, There Were Murals, supra note 251.
267. See Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
268. See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 51.
269. See infra Part I.B.
270. See infra Part III.A.
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capacity. A work of visual art need not be accessible to the
general population to be considered publicly displayed.
“Publicly Funded” shall mean a work of visual art which
received the majority of its financial funding from public
sources. Examples of sources which constitute public funding
shall include, but are not limited to, National Endowment for the
Arts grants and state Percentage for the Arts programs. A work
of visual art which has been privately funded and donated to the
government or a governmental unit shall be considered
“Publicly Funded.”
“Recognized Stature” shall mean that the artist or group of
artists responsible for the creation of the work of visual art are
generally known within their respective artistic community.
General knowledge of the artist or artists within the community
can be shown through, but is not limited to, newspaper or
magazine articles, public exposure, or word-of-mouth
reputation.
“Removal” shall mean making any publicly displayed work of
visual art unavailable for public viewing, whether it be to the
general public or a more limited subset, for a period of time of
more than two (2) years.
“Work of Visual Art” shall mean any permanent painting,
photographic or pictorial representation, sculpture, or threedimensional object of recognized stature. This list shall be
construed broadly. An artwork shall not be considered a work
of visual art if:
(1) it constitutes part of a series of more than two hundred
(200) reproductions; or
(2) was created for the purposes of business promotion; or
(3) is primarily decorative in nature.
(b) REMOVAL OF A PUBLICLY FUNDED, PUBLICLY DISPLAYED CLASSIC
WORK OF VISUAL ART
(1) A Classic Work of Visual Art shall be any work of visual art
that is directly associated with the government or a
governmental unit. Direct association with the Government or a
governmental unit shall be determined if:
(A) the title of the Work of Visual art is directly associated
with the government or a governmental unit or a figure,
event or other occurrence of local or national importance;
and
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(B) the location of the Work of Visual Art is directly
associated with or could reasonably be seen as being
directly associated with the government or a governmental
unit; and
(C) the subject matter of the Work of Visual Art is directly
associated with or could be reasonably seen as being
directly associated with a figure, event, or other occurrence
of local or national importance; and
(D) the Work of Visual Art as a whole is strongly
associated with the government or a governmental unit in
the mind of the public.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(1), a Classic Work of
Visual Art of Recognized Stature shall not be removed from
Public Display unless: (A) the government or governmental unit
can articulate some legitimate government interest reasonably
related to the removal of the Classic Work of Visual Art.
(c) REMOVAL OF A PUBLICLY FUNDED, PUBLICLY DISPLAYED BLENDED
WORK OF VISUAL ART
(1) A Blended Work of Visual Art shall be any Work of Visual
Art that, while not directly associated with the government or a
governmental unit, is or could be indirectly associated with the
government or a governmental unit. Indirect association shall be
determined if two or more of the following are found:
(A) the title of the Work of Visual Art is strongly
associated with the government or a governmental unit or a
figure, event or other occurrence of local or national
importance; or
(B) the location of the Work of Visual Art is strongly
associated with or could reasonably be seen as being
strongly associated with the government or a governmental
unit; or
(C) the subject matter of the Work of Visual Art is strongly
associated with or could be reasonably seen as being
strongly associated with a figure, event, or other
occurrence of local or national importance; or
(D) the Work of Visual Art as a whole is strongly
associated with the government or a governmental unit in
the mind of the public.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(1), a Blended Work of
Visual Art of Recognized Stature shall not be removed from
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Public Display unless: the government or governmental unit can
articulate some important government interest substantially
related to the removal of the BlendedWork of Visual Art.
(d) REMOVAL OF A PUBLICLY FUNDED, PUBLICLY DISPLAYED NONBLENDED WORK OF VISUAL ART
(1) A Non-Blended Work of Visual Art is any work of visual art
not classified as a classic Work of Visual Art or a Blended Work
of Visual Art under paragraphs (b)(1) or (c)(1).
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(1), a Non-Blended Work
of Visual Art of Recognized Stature shall not be removed from
Public Display unless the government or governmental unit can
articulate some compelling government interest that is narrowly
tailored to the removal of the Non-Blended Work of Visual Art.
(e) EXCEPTIONS
(1) Despite the classification of the Work of Visual Art under
paragraphs (b)(1), (c)(1) or (d)(1), the government or a
governmental unit may justify the Removal of a Work of Visual
Art if:
(A) the Work of Visual Art is vulgar, offensive, or offends
current standards of morality; or
(B) maintaining, preserving, or continued display of the
Work of Visual Art imposes a significant financial burden
on the Government or governmental unit; or
(C) the Work of Visual Art substantially impairs the
general public’s use or enjoyment of the space in which the
Work of Visual Art is located.
(f) NO CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION OR OTHER PENALTIES
(1) No good faith removal or attempt at removal by the
government or a governmental unit of a work of visual art shall:
(A) result in a civil claim or cause of action for damages;
unless
(B) the good faith removal or attempted Removal of the
Work of Visual Art results in the irreparable physical
destruction or mutilation of the Work of Visual Art, in
which case the artist or artists shall have a civil claim for
damages.
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B. Discussion of the Statutory Provisions
The statutory provisions listed above satisfy the scope of the
Government Speech Doctrine, take into account the mutable nature of art
speech, and are consistent with artist moral rights. The scope of the
Doctrine is satisfied by three main components: (1) the statute’s focus on
the association between the instant art speech and the government; (2) the
correlation between the likelihood of association with the amount of
control the government has over the art speech; and (3) the creation of
exceptions for the government to regulate art speech regardless of
association, taking into account that art is speech and thus subject to narrow
regulations. The mutable nature of art speech is taken into account by the
statute because the “blended work of visual art” section has the broadest
potential reach and does not overly favor individuals or the government,
thus keeping in mind that the message conveyed by art is difficult to
determine. Lastly, the definition section of the statute incorporates various
moral rights identified by the courts. These benefits of the statute are
discussed more thoroughly below.
First, the proposed statute circumvents the ill-defined boundaries of
the Government Speech Doctrine and puts in place guidelines when
regulating art speech.271
The statute simplifies the bifurcated
considerations of control and association the Court takes into consideration
when discussing whether speech is government speech.272 Rather than
focus on control and association, in instances where initial control has been
exhausted, the statute focuses only on association,273 which will never be
exhausted, depleted, or exercised and is therefore an appropriate analytical
starting place.
Second, the definition section of the proposed statute will help expand
and simplify the analysis of what would be considered a publicly funded,
publicly displayed work of visual art274 and codify certain artist moral
271. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 873 (1982) (noting that “criteria
that appear[s] on [its] face to be permissible” may be an appropriate basis for
reversing a prior governmental action so long as that criteria stems from
established policies).
272. See, e.g., Proposed Statute Removal of Publicly Funded, Publicly
Displayed Works of Visual Art § (b)(1) [hereinafter “Proposed Statute”]; see also
infra Part I.C.
273. See id. §§ (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1) (considering the likeliness of the art
speech to be associated with the government when determining appropriate
removal framework analysis).
274. See id. § (a). The “Publicly Funded” language would allow works of
visual art such as the Washington Monument or the Chicago Picasso to be
analyzed under the statute although neither was completely government-funded.
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rights275 without being overly broad.276 By creating a broader analytical
framework for what would be considered “publicly funded” and “publicly
displayed” while narrowly defining “work of visual art,” the proposed
statute will not narrowly reach only completely government-funded works
of visual art, but also reach more classic forms of public art such as
sculptures and murals.277 By codifying certain moral rights recognized by
the courts, the proposed statute would dissuade litigation by artists without
unduly trampling the right of integrity.278 The Constitution also “protects
the right to receive information and ideas,” so prohibiting the permanent
removal of an artwork from public display279 also ensures that the public
has continued access to the message and ideas conveyed by the art in
question.280
See e.g., Washington Monument, NAT’L PARKS SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/wash/dc72.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014) (noting
that some privately raised funds were used in the completion of the Washington
Monument). The “publicly displayed” language would allow works of visual art
displayed in places such as government buildings to be considered “publicly
displayed,” despite the fact that some members of the public may not actually have
access to the work of visual art or the work may not available to view all the time.
275. See Proposed Statute § (a). The “Recognized Stature” language would
codify the ruling in Martin which allowed “recognized stature” to be proved
without calling an expert witness, which would be prohibitively expensive for
many artists wishing to enforce their moral rights. See Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999). The “Removal” language would
allow a work of visual art to be temporarily taken down without fear that an artist
would leverage his or her right of integrity via a lawsuit, while simultaneously
ensuring that the work of visual art was not put in permanent storage (the
equivalent of being reversibly destroyed) and that the public was not deprived
access to the information or idea conveyed by the work of visual art.
276. See Proposed Statute § (a). The “Work of Visual Art” language draws
from text of the Copyright Act that was specifically drafted to make VARA’s
reach narrow. Compare 17 U.S.C. §101 (2013) (defining a “Work of Visual Art”
only as a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture . . . or a still photographic
image.”), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1)–(8) (granting copyright protection to literary
works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomime, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and architectural works).
277. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472-73

(2009).
278. See Proposed Statute § (a). The “Recognized Stature” language would
codify the ruling in Martin which allowed “recognized stature” to be proved
without calling an expert witness, which would be prohibitively expensive for
many artists wishing to enforce their moral rights. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 612.
279. See Proposed Statute § (a). The “Removal” language prohibits an
artwork from being out of public display for more than 2 years.
280. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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Third, the statute takes into consideration the tension between the
rights of a private artist and government speech rights.281 In instances
where the government would be directly associated with a work of visual
art,282 the analytical framework for the removal of that work gives the
government quite a bit of latitude.283 Conversely, where the government
would only be weakly associated with the work of visual art,284 the
analytical framework for the removal of that work of visual art triggers
classic private, individual free speech protections.285 In the middle ground
where the nature of the speech is less clear,286 neither the government nor
the individual is given too much latitude as to control of the speech.287 By
using the language “associated,” the proposed statute keeps in mind the
underlying association considerations implied by the Supreme Court in the
various Government Speech Doctrine Cases previously discussed.288 The
use of constitutional scrutiny framework dependent on the definition of the
work of visual art keeps in mind that art speech is constitutionally
protected.289 However, the use of varying frameworks within the proposed
statute still grants the government latitude consistent with the Government
Speech Doctrine cases in controlling messages with which it is
associated.290 To classify a work of visual art as classic, blended, or nonblended meshes smoothly with the Forum Doctrine.291 In instances where
281. See Proposed Statute §§ (b)–(d).
282. See id. §§ (b)(1)(A)–(D).
283. See id. §§ (a)–(b)(2)(A).
284. See id. § (d)(1).
285. See id. § (d)(2)(A).
286. See id. §§ (c)(1)(A)–(D). The language of this section, by using “or”
instead of “and,” makes it easier for speech to be considered blended. See also
supra Parts II.A–B (taking into consideration the difficulty of pinning down the
exact nature of art speech).
287. See Proposed Statute § (c)(2)(A).
288. See id. §§ (b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A), (d)(2)(A).
289. Art is protected speech under the First Amendment speech, with the
general narrow exceptions to First Amendment protection still applying. See
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (finding that artworks such as Jackson Pollock paintings are
“unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment); see also Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) (providing that
there are narrow exceptions to the First Amendment, thus private individual speech
is generally analyzed under strict scrutiny framework).
290. See Proposed Statute § (b)(2)(A) (giving the government broad
discretion when the art is likely to be associated with the government).
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the government or a governmental unit exercises more control over the art
speech in question,292 the likelihood that a limited public forum was created
is much lower.293
Lastly, the proposed statute, via its exceptions and no civil damages
sections, avoids making the removal of publicly funded, publicly displayed
artwork overly burdensome for the government or a governmental unit.294
The government or a governmental unit would not be required to display
obscene works of visual art,295 taking into account that art can change
meaning over time and potentially become offensive to standard social
values.296 The proposed statute would also not impose unduly burdensome
costs to maintain artwork297 or deprive the public the right to enjoy its
space.298
The proposed statute would not, except under narrow
291. See id. §§ (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1); see also supra Part I.A.
292. See Proposed Statute §§ (b)(1)–(2), (c)(1)–(2). In instances where there
is a Classic Work of Visual Art, the work of art must be on government property;
while in instances where there is a Blended Work of Visual Art, there is a strong
likelihood that the work of art will be on government property.
293. This is because the government or a governmental unit has not
indiscriminately opened up its facilities to multiple forums of artistic expression,
but rather only for the limited purpose of displaying specific messages. See, e.g.,
Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting the MDOL waiting
room could not be considered a public forum); see also Summum, 555 U.S. at 469
(where the court also acknowledged that in certain instances a government entity
may create a limited forum imposing reasonable and viewpoint neutral restrictions
on speech). See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983) (describing how a limited public forum is created); Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 143 (2001).
294. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding that “removal of the [artwork] is a permissible time, place, and
manner restriction,” and “such restrictions are valid ‘provided that they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Proposed Statute § (f).
295. See Proposed Statute § (e)(1)(A) (keeping the Proposed Statute
consistent with the idea that art is speech and thus subject to normal, albeit narrow,
free speech regulations). See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (finding
obscenity to be outside the realm of free speech protection); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (allowing government to restrict the distribution of child
pornography).
296. See supra Part II.B.
297. See Proposed Statute § (e)(1)(B) (allowing the Government to destroy
or relocate, say, WPA projects that are incorporated into dilapidated housing
projects); O’Connor, supra note 193, at 227.
298. See generally Proposed Statute § (e)(1)(C) (permitting the public and
the government the right to remove public art if it substantially impairs the public’s
use of the space in which its located); see also Serra, 847 F.2d at 1050 (permitting
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circumstances, impose civil penalties on governments or governmental
units, thus avoiding potential chilling effects to public art funding.299
Ultimately, this proposed statute balances the rights of the
government to speak with private individual speech rights and artist moral
rights. By adopting a proposed statute like this one, a government could
dissuade litigation and make the removal of publicly funded, publicly
displayed works of visual art less contentious and more predictable.
C. Application and Potential Ramifications of the Statutory Provisions
How would Newton v. LePage have turned under the proposed
statute? Ironically, the case probably would have come out differently, but
only because of LePage’s rationale for the removal of the mural.300 Rather
than focus on the rights of the government to speak through art from
various Circuit opinions,301 the First Circuit could have simply analyzed the
mural as government speech because its title, location, subject matter, and
public association were all associated with the Maine government. After
that, all LePage would have had to do was articulate a reasonable
justification for the removal of the mural, which he failed to do.302 Had this
statute been in place in Maine prior to LePage, it may well have prevented

the government to remove public art for non-content based reasons such as
functional purposes).
299. The government or governmental units should not be financially liable
for attempting to remove artwork for which they have already funded. It would be
unfair to penalize an entity for a work of visual art it helped bring into existence.
See Proposed Statute § (f)(1)(A). The Proposed Statute keeps in place the artist’s
right of integrity for the physical mutilation or destruction of a work of visual art,
but the language “irreparable” makes that right more limited considering the
definition of “removal” is already favorable to artists and incorporates
considerations regarding their moral rights.
300. See Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 597 (1st Cir. 2012); see also
CHRISTO & JEANNE-CLAUDE, http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/faq (accessed
under “Who Pays for the Installations?” subheading) (last visited Apr. 25, 2014)
(emphasizing that one of the most well-known and prolific public artists of our
time refused to accept public funding for fear of compromising his artistic
integrity).
301. The First Circuit referenced dicta from numerous non-binding sources.
See, e.g., Serra, 847 F.2d at 1049 (finding no First Amendment violation for
relocation of a federally commissioned sculpture); Ill. Dunesland Pres. Soc’y v. Ill.
Dept. of Natural Res., 584 F.3d 719, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no First
Amendment violation when a state park declined to display certain items on sale
racks).
302. Funding streams are not a legitimate reason. See Nat’l Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998).
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the litigation, as LePage could have pointed to it for clear, reliable authority
justifying the removal of the mural.
The statute is also not without its potential ramifications. Considering
moral rights can be waived, it seems unfortunate that an attempt to more
effectively codify those rights may cause a movement towards their
contractual forfeiture. While the proposed statute attempts to address this
by codifying certain moral rights in its language,303 the moral rights it
attempts to codify are narrower than those granted by VARA, so the
proposed statute has the potential to weaken certain artist moral rights.
Again, though, the potential chilling effect such a movement may have on
the arts community304 may be sufficient impetus to prevent a strong push
towards requiring artists to forfeit their moral rights in their art works.
VI. CONCLUSION
Art reflects our culture. From the Lincoln Memorial to a Rothko
color field, art tells us where we have been, where we are, and where we
are going. We have been to and experienced some places collectively—
wars, depressions, recessions, elections—and these events are often
commemorated by our government. When the government speaks about
these events, which helps forge our collective identity, it should have the
ability to control that speech, as in many ways it is only through the
existence and action of our government that these events came to be.
However, when the government merely encourages individuals to create, it
assumes some risk that the speech it encourages will be challenging or
challenged. However, this is the purpose of art. It pushes us, causes us to
self-reflect, and ultimately speaks of things greater than ourselves. In those
capacities, the government should not be able to fund art and then regulate
it, for it does us all a disservice. This concern is especially pertinent in an
era where the appropriate size of the government is a contentious issue.
Ultimately, however, once you have funded and displayed a piece of art
that speech has been spoken. In that most proverbial sense, you cannot
unring that bell.

303. See Proposed Statute § (f)(1)(B).
304. See CHRISTO & JEANNE-CLAUDE, supra note 300.
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APPENDIX
1. Susan Sharon, Labor Mural Panel Wide Shot, Maine Public
Broadcasting (2012) (available at https://flic.kr/p/dLw76t).

2. Jesse Hamerman, Discovering Columbus (2012) (available at
http://www.publicartfund.org/view/exhibitions/5495_discovering_columbus).
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3. Go Sugimoto, Discovering Columbus (2012) (available at
http://www.publicartfund.org/view/exhibitions/5495_discovering_columbus).

4.
Brian Woychuk,
https://flic.kr/p/co5DoA).

The

Picasso

(2012)

(available

at
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5. Chris Smith, Just Me and the Bean (2012) (available at
https://flic.kr/p/bnk4oC).

6. Williamsburg Murals move to a new location, Brooklyn Museum
(2009) (available at https://flic.kr/p/6eVnqS).

